' The bridge that was worth it's weight in gold'

'Never comes the Day' The Moody Blues


Allied Gold Declaration of February 1944
The January 5, 1943, declaration did not directly address the German export of gold. The British Ministry of Economic Warfare became increasingly concerned in the Spring of 1943 that the Germans were resorting to the sale of gold to meet their commercial debts to neutral nations providing vital supplies for the Nazi war effort. In view of the German needs and the size of the pre-war gold reserve, such gold sales were, the MEW thought, certain to be of monetary gold looted in Western Europe. The Foreign Office proposed a warning to the neutrals that if they accepted gold from Germany they would be opening themselves to claims under the terms of the January 1943 Declaration. The British Treasury considered such a warning useless inasmuch as looted gold could be melted down and made unrecognizable. In June 1943 the State Department was unwilling to join in issuing such a warning, although the Treasury Department seemed inclined to take such an action.

In November 1943 Treasury asked State to agree to the issuance of a statement on looted gold acquired by the neutral nations in dealings with Germany. The Treasury argued that the United States should not recognize the transfers of Axis gold and should not purchase gold from a nation dealing with the Axis unless it could be determined that gold had not come from the Axis, directly or indirectly. The British Foreign Office found this American proposal for a declaration far too sweeping when the State Department presented it late in 1943. Although the British Treasury was concerned that the action proposed would cause Britain and the United States "many embarrassments" after the war, both Treasury and the Bank of England swung around to willingness to support a gold declaration in the interest of Anglo-American relations.

The Declaration on Gold Purchases of February 22, 1944, made in the United States by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, stated that the United States would not recognize the transference of title to looted gold which the Axis at any time held or had disposed of in world markets. It further declared that the United States would not buy any gold located outside the territorial limits of the United States from any country which had not broken relations with the Axis, or from any country which subsequently acquired gold from any country which had not broken relations with the Axis, unless and until the United States was fully satisfied that such gold was not acquired directly or indirectly from the Axis powers, or was not gold which any such country had been or was able to release as a result of the acquisition of gold directly or indirectly from the Axis powers. Britain and the Soviet Union made similar declarations on the same day.

Major-General J.F.C. (John Frederick Charles) Fuller (1878-1966) is often associated with Liddell Hart, but the men were in many ways quite different. Fuller belonged to an older generation; his practical military experience was much greater; his interests were until a rather late date more narrowly tactical and technological; and his view of Clausewitz was much less static, undergoing considerable evolution.

The title page of his memoirs quotes Herakleitos: "Asses would rather have refuse than gold." Fuller made it quite clear that this line was directed at the British military leadership. Someone skeptical of Fuller's approach might observe that the asses in this case were simply being sensible, preferring the digestible to the merely ornamental.

Both men were also profoundly shaken by the experience of the First World War; both made their reputations as advocates of mechanization; and both suffered an eclipse in reputation during the Second World War (Fuller for his prewar connections with British fascism and for his alleged advocacy of an all-armored, tank-heavy force, universally rejected by 1943). Once out of uniform, each made his living through journalism, a profession that greatly affected the style, if not necessarily the content, of their writings. Both ended their days as rehabilitated military prophets, with considerable honor in their own countries as well as abroad.

Here you can read an article about 'The Merker's Mine Treasure'

Watch this Map and this Map of the American Rhine-Crossings, March 1945. General Dwight Eisenhower said that the bridge at Remagen was 'worth it's weight in gold' .
Now also take a close look at 'Merkers-Kieselbach' on the Map The Remagen bridge paved the way for the Merker's Mine Treasure.



Here you can read what I found in Dutch 'war-literature' about the gold of the Nederlandse Bank during the war : "Zwijgen betekende Goud"